We study the problem of forensic identification when the trace evidence from the scene of the crime is imperfect: for example, it might be measured with error, or be partially missing. A general framework for imperfect data is developed, and applied in particular to the following cases, singly and in combination: 'measurement error' in the recorded information at the scene of the crime; 'binning', i.e. discretisation of an originally continuous crime measurement; 'paternity testing', in which the DNA profiles of the child and of the mother provide partial information on the true father's DNA; two types of 'laboratory error', one in which the error is equally distributed among all possible results, and a second in which there is a bias in the error mechanism producing a false match; and 'partial data', as when there is information on the offender's DNA profile, but not on his racial group.
INTRODUCTION
A crime has been committed and there is a known population £ of individuals, one of whom is the culprit. We denote by C the unknown label of the culprit. Associated with each individual i e J in the population is a characteristic y x which may be binary, discrete or continuous, univariate or multivariate. From a trace, e.g. of blood, semen, fibres, left at the scene of the crime, and presumed to originate from the perpetrator, a measurement is taken relating to the characteristic Xc °f the culprit. In addition, measurements of the characteristic x are available on an identified set a of individuals. In a criminal investigation hinging on DNA evidence, for example, these might include one or more suspects and their relatives, and, in addition, a police database of DNA profiles, classified by race.
In previous work it has been supposed that the trace at the crime scene consists of an exact measurement on xc-1° this paper we shall relax this condition, allowing for evidence which is in some sense incomplete or imperfect. However, we continue to suppose that perfect measurement on x is possible for all the identified individuals in a. For example, the crime sample might yield the offender's DNA profile, but not his racial group. Or, in paternity testing, the 'imperfect information' on the true father's DNA is given by the child's DNA, whereas exact DNA measurements are available on identified individuals. We shall also consider cases where the trace from the scene is measured with error, either random, or systematic as in some types of laboratory mishandling.
The total evidence consists of the following items.
(a) Background or other non-forensic evidence, &C In all our further analysis this background evidence will be supposed to have already been taken into account. In particular, although it will not be expressed in the notation, all probabilities are always conditional on Jf. For i e J we let n { denote the 'prior probability' pr(C = i\JV) that individual i is the culprit.
(b) Evidence from the sample gathered at the scene of the crime, <S. As in Dawid & Mortera (1996) , this evidence is supposed to relate solely to the characteristic xc °f the culprit. Thus, in the notation for conditional independence of Dawid (1979) ,
<ZAL( X ,C)\Xc.
(1) (c) Evidence on known individuals, x a = £• A set a c £ of individuals has been examined and for each individual i e a the characteristic Xi has been observed. We suppose that the set a was determined in advance, or else that the process governing its determination was uninformative (Dawid & Mortera, 1996) ; this condition is relaxed in § 5. We denote by Xa = {Xi-iz <*} the vector of these individuals' characteristics, and by ^a={^,:iea} the vector of their observed values. In a courtroom context, there will be a specific individual s on trial, and then we shall have sea. Sometimes only s is examined, so that a = {s}, but there will often also be measurements of x for other individuals, perhaps on other potential suspects, or relatives of the accused, or on individuals contained in a database.
We further suppose (Dawid & Mortera, 1996) that the characteristic x is not intrinsically incriminating, in the absence of the evidence S. That is
where x here denotes {xt'-ie^}. We allow the joint distribution of x to be arbitrary, but will give particular consideration to Models E and F of Dawid & Mortera (1996) . Under Model E the {&:ie./} are exchangeable, given the background evidence JC; its special case Model F further takes the Xi as conditionally independent and identically distributed, given some parameters which are themselves modelled as random.
In § 2 we review the analysis for accurate measurements, and in § 3 we present the general framework for analysing situations where the evidence is imperfect. In § 4 we show how various important problems such as measurement error, data binning, paternity testing and laboratory error all fit into the general framework of § 3, which yields valuable results and insights for each of these problems. Section 5 presents an alternative formulation to deal with cases of missing information. Balding & Donnelly (1995a) and Dawid & Mortera (1996) have dealt in detail with the case that the crime evidence & consists of an exact measurement of Xc-where x is the measurement obtained on the crime sample. The information in (b) and (c) in § 1 is then used to compute the posterior probability of guilt for individual i:
ACCURATE EVIDENCE

Exact match
where the likelihood can be taken as
Note that
It is important to realise that (4) involves conditioning on all the evidence available, including, in particular, the suspect's characteristic.
When the specific value x of the characteristic is very rare, we will typically have (i) /? = {s}, and (ii) L, is very small for i $ a. Then (4) becomes negligible for i =( = s: a unique match on a rare characteristic is highly incriminating. So long as the prior probability of guilt is not so small as to counteract the effect of this, an important proviso when there is no other incriminating evidence, the posterior probability of guilt will then be essentially unity. In the limit where the characteristic is a continuous variable, we obtain, in principle, certain evidence of guilt.
2-2. Exchangeability
Under Model E, we have L t = l{x) for i 4 a, where
does not depend on i (i 4 a), by exchangeability, and represents the predictive probability of an unobserved individual having characteristic x, given the characteristics of the identified individuals. This is often termed the 'match probability'. In particular, if the suspect s is found to match the crime sample, Xs = *> ms posterior probability of guilt is where /? = {i:ie a, Zix ) is the set of individuals observed to match the crime sample. Under Model F, we can further represent the Xi 2& independent and identically distributed, each with probability function p(.\6), conditional on some parameter 9 which itself has a prior density n{9), say. Then
where p(6\x a = Z) is the posterior density of 6 based on the data on individuals in a, including the suspect. For example, when z = (X 1 ,..., X K ) is a DNA profile with K unlinked markers, we might take
with 9 k parameterising the marginal distribution of X k . When these distributions are essentially unconstrained, and a is extensive, (7) could be crudely approximated by j(x) = n k = 1 /*(x*), f k {x k ) denoting the relative frequency of 'X k = x*' among individuals in a. The effect of including the suspect, who is in a and matches the crime sample x, can be important here, and will typically have the effect of increasing the estimated match probability, so weakening the case against the suspect (Balding & Donnelly, 1995b) . The need to condition on the suspect was overlooked in the influential U.S. National Research Council (1996) report.
INACCURATE EVIDENCE: GENERAL FRAMEWORK
For simplicity, we continue to suppose that, for each individual i e a, the characteristic yj is fully observed without error. However, from the crime sample, only partial or corrupted information is available on x c , the characteristic of the culprit.
We denote the variable actually recorded on the crime sample by Z, and its observed value by z. Thus the evidence from the crime sample is now &:Z = z.
We assume that 8 contains no further relevant evidence beyond specification of the value of Z:
All other assumptions made in § 1 above are retained. From (1) we have
We suppose that, given Xc = x, the probability function or density function of Z has a known form, g(z \ x). This will reflect the process of measurement error, data missingness, etc. applying to the crime sample. In addition, we have the complete observations x* -£ fr°m known individuals. From (9) we have that so that, given x<i and Z = z, there is no further information in the crime sample about the culprit. Thus the posterior probability of guilt for suspect i is
with L*ocpr(x a = £,Z = z\C = i). Assuming for simplicity that the characteristic x is discrete, we have
For continuous x similar formulae apply with sums replaced by integrals. Now pr(x a = £, | C = i) = pr(/ a = £) using (2) and does not depend on i, and, by (2) again,
where L ; (x) is given in (4); compare equation (25) of Dawid & Mortera (1996) , which deals with the case of binary characteristics. In particular,
For Model E we further obtain
where
is the predictive density for Z at z, based on data Xa = £• Here we are regarding the observation Z as made on some specific individual i $ a.
SPECIAL VERSIONS OF THE GENERAL APPROACH
41. Measurement error Suppose Z is a noisy measurement of y c :
where the error e is independent of % c , with density f(e). Then we have
Similarly we can handle multiplicative or other forms of error.
Example 1: Simple normal model. Suppose that the characteristics x are independent normally distributed with unknown mean /z: &|/z~iV(//, a 2 ); and that /i has a normal prior distribution: /i ~ JV(A, T 2 ). This is a case of Model F. This structure was used by Lindley (1977) for the analysis of glass fragment traces, and by Berry, Evett & Pinchin (1992) 
with o 2 n = o 2 + x 2 n . We take the measurement error e to be normally distributed: e ~ N(0, y 2 ). The predictive distribution of Z is then
We thus obtain likelihood terms
j^^j (tea),
For a large database S, a 2 -a 2 and k H -£, which may be calculated from the database excluding the suspect to a good approximation. Then we get l*{z) -{2;i(y 2 + a 2 )} "* exp ( -As the measurement variance y 2 -^ with everything else fixed, l*(z) has a finite limit, while, for i ea, L* -> 0, unless & = z exactly. With a perfect measurement, nothing short of an exact observed match can be incriminating. More generally, when y is small, for the likelihood ratio comparing i e a with an arbitrary individual outside a to be substantial, we need £; -z to be of order at most y(-2 logy)*. Note that this still allows ^ -z to be in the extreme tail of its 'null distribution' JV(O, y 2 ): this is an example of'Lindley's paradox' (Lindley, 1957) , where the Bayes analysis is asymptotically at odds with a classical hypothesis test.
4-2. Coarse data
Another application of our general framework arises when the crime sample characteristic is measured on a coarsened scale. For example, a continuous variable is 'binned' into a finite number of fixed discrete categories. In this case the observation 'Z = z' is equivalent to a statement of the form 'xc e A\ for some fixed subset A of the sample space for xHence
We thus obtain
In particular, 
where <X> is the standard normal distribution function. When (b -a)/a is small, and the suspect s is the only observed individual whose characteristic lies in (a, b) , the likelihood ratio comparing s with an arbitrary individual is approximately proportional to {b -a)~l, and thus becomes increasingly incriminating as {b -a) -*• 0. Of course, as the interval surrounding Xc ls allowed to shrink, s may well end up being excluded.
4-3. Data-based binning
Suppose that the crime sample is binned, leading to crime 'data' &: Xc e ^> but that the bin A has been selected in a way depending on the observed values of x x -F°r example (Weir & Gaut, 1993) , for a single DNA VNTR band a 'match' between the crime measurement Xc aQ d the suspect measurement Xs might be declared if
where c could be 0025. Then we take the crime evidence & as Xc e A where This is an example of the 'floating bin' method (Balazs et al., 1989) of 'match-binning'. In such a case, the bin A used is in fact a realisation of a set-valued random quantity, A, say. Since the bin is chosen in a way which depends only on Za , we shall assume
It follows in particular that AlL Z clXa> so that the choice of bin A, the realisation of A, is uninformative about the crime sample, given the measurements £ of x* on the observed individuals. We shall treat the exact value of Xc as unavailable, the only information on it being that it falls into the set A; this is the approach used in match-binning. Our data are thus (Xc G -4) Xa = £> A = A), and so the posterior probabilities of guilt are
xpr( Za = £|C = i).
Now, by (21), Zj _LL A|( Za , C), so that (22) Also, by (21), (23) equals pr(A = A \ x x = £)» which may be ignored since it does not depend on i. Similarly, by (2), (24) may be ignored. Hence we obtain exactly as if A had been a fixed bin. That is, under the assumptions made here, we can ignore the fact that the binning is data-based.
In the case of Model F, (7), a crude approximation to L ; for i £ a is given by nf=i/*C<4*), where A k is the bin of form (20) and base frequency calculations on these bins, formed around the crime sample x c , rather than, as in (20), around the suspect sample x 3 -Our analysis points to (20) as the correct method of constructing a floating bin. Note that the alternative so-called 'fixed bin' method (National Research Council, 1996, p. 143) also involves calculating a frequency for a bin which depends on x c , varying according as how a window such as B in (25) overlaps fixed intervals of the measurement scale. So this again is a case of data-based binning, and again the standard procedure, based on a window around % c , should be replaced by one based around #,.
4*4. Crime sample measured with error and binned
We can combine the analyses of § § 41 and 4-2 above, to deal with binned noisy measurements. Indeed, noise in the measurements is the principal reason why match-binning is used. The observation on the crime sample is now of the form 'Z e A\ and we obtain Lf = pr(Z, e A \ x a = £)> where Z; denotes a noisy measurement made on individual i. Once again, we can ignore any data-dependence of the choice of bin A, under suitable assumptions.
The information on the observation Z = z is replaced by the assertion Z e A, where typically A is a possibly data-based interval around z such that pr(Z e A | Xc = x ) iS effectively 1. Then, if £, is sufficiently close to z, L* will be close to 1, while, for i £ a, the 'match probability', Lf, can be very small, thus providing strong evidence against s. If we take (a, b) = {z-cy,z + cy), where, say, c>4, then Lf -1 if ie a, |£,--z| <y; if y 2 « a 2 , then /* = 2c{y/a) (j>{(z -(,) /a} « 1, so long as c is not too large.
4-5. Paternity testing
In paternity testing (Balding & Nichols, 1995) the DNA profiles of the child and of the mother yield partial information about the true father's DNA. Our analysis in § 3 applies, after conditioning on the mother's DNA.
In this scenario, C refers to the 'culprit', i.e. the true father, and Xc is his unknown DNA profile. The incriminating evidence $: Z = z is given by the child's DNA profile. Now, as well as the database of DNA profiles Xa = £> including those of one or more individuals suspected of being the father, we also have the mother's DNA profile, x mIt seems reasonable to assume that possession of a particular DNA profile does not in itself make a man more likely to be the father. This is implied by assumption (2), which we again impose: note that it implies that ClLx m -Furthermore, we assume that (9) still holds and that, given the mother's and true father's DNA profiles, the child's DNA profile is independent of the other measured profiles: this is justified by genetic considerations, so long as no descendant of the child has been measured. That is
The posterior probability that individual i is the father of the child is then
By (2), the first factor in (27) is just pr(C = i) = n t . If we assume that the DNA profile is discrete, as for STR markers, for instance, and apply (2) and (26), the second factor in (27), the likelihood Lf, is
say. The first term in (28), g(z | m, x) = pr(Z = z | x m = £ m > Xc = *)> is determined by Mendel's law, whereby, given the mother's and father's DNA profiles, the probability that their child has profile z is known. In the second term, L,(x) = pr(#< = x| x m = £m> Lt = £)> the set a could also include females' DNA profiles, although n t = 0 if i is female. Calculation of L,(x) requires genetic modelling of the population. This term will also take into account any genetic relatedness between the parents. Further generalisations may readily be introduced, such as possible mutations in the child's profile, or unavailability of the mother's DNA profile. In the latter case, DNA information on relatives of the mother could be informative for determining the probability of a putative father's guilt.
Laboratory error
In the context of DNA profiling, it is sometimes claimed that the probability of some contamination, mix-up orother form of laboratory or handling error, even though small, will typically be of a larger order of magnitude than the tiny match probabilities calculated on the assumption of no error, and that the effect of this will be to overwhelm and thus invalidate such match probabilities (Balding & Donnelly, 1995b) . This is reminiscent of the position of Hume (1748) in arguing against the credibility of reports of miracles: the chance of a false report exceeding greatly the prior probability of a miracle, we should believe in a failure of human testimony rather than of the laws of Nature. However, Price (1767) gave the counter-argument that it is reasonable to believe in a report of winning lottery numbers published in a newspaper, even though the probability of a printers' error far exceeds the probability that those specific numbers should have won. See Dawid & Gillies (1989) for an analysis of the statistical logic underlying these arguments.
In the context of our model of § 3, we take Z to be the possibly contaminated or erroneous measurement of the crime sample £c> with the conditional distribution g{z\x) describing the error process. We consider two distinct scenarios, analogous respectively to Price's lottery case and to Hume's miracles case:
(i) there is no particular bias in the error mechanism towards the declaration of a false match; (ii) there is such a bias. For illustrative purposes, we consider particularly simple forms for the error process. These can be considered as demarcating opposite extremes of the range of realistic situations.
Case (i). The characteristic % is discrete, with K possible values. The total chance of an error is e. If an error is made, it is just as likely to result in any outcome, including fortuitously the correct one, as any other. Thus we have -6
We further assume Model E. Applying (13), we obtain
where /(.) is given by (5). Suppose, for example, that there is no database of profiles apart from that of the suspect, whose measured profile agrees with the crime profile z. Then, for small e, comparing (29) with the results in § 1, we see that the likelihood is essentially the same as that which would be obtained from an accurate crime sample having match probability or, for l(z)« e, approximately l{z) + E/K. If we have, say l{z) = 10" 6 , e = 10~3, K = 10 4 , the effect of taking into account the possibility of an erroneous measurement is to replace a match probability of 10~6 by one of 10~6+ 10~7, and thus has negligible consequences, even though the probability of error is much larger than the match probability. The fact that this error is spread among all the 10 4 possible outcomes has the effect of diluting its impact.
Case (ii). If a mistake is made, which happens with probability e, it will be to misread the actual crime sample profile as being identical with that of the suspect, £,. In this case the error process is not independent of the data £" but our analysis is not affected so long as we argue conditionally on £". Thus we now have if z = x, otherwise, with, of course, g(£,\!;,) = 1. Again assuming Model E, and that the reading z on the crime sample is in fact the same as £" application of (13) 
(l-e)/(z) ifi^a. If there are no data except for the suspect, the effect of taking this error mechanism into account is to change a match probability of /(z) to one of £ + (1 -e)/(z), the latter being essentially e when /(z)« e. For the same illustrative values as used in (i) above, the change is from 10" 6 to 10 ~3. We see that, when scenario (ii) above can be taken seriously, the criticism that even a small probability of error will overwhelm a tiny match probability is a valid one. However, under scenario (i) this need not be so, but the effect will depend on the extent to which the error is 'diluted' among different possible outcomes: more specifically, on the probability of obtaining exactly the result seen, as a function of the true value.
AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION
5-1. An ambiguity
When we refer to properties of 'individual V, it may not be clear just what it is appropriate to assume known about him or her. This difficulty typically affects the 'unseen' individuals, rather than those in the measured set a, whom we may be able to identify as distinct individuals, although in some cases the information about individuals in a database may not be sufficient to identify them fully.
For example, i might simply be a number in a real or hypothetical administrative list; i might specify the individual's name, from which sex, and perhaps race and other information, might be inferred; or i might, explicitly or implicitly, carry still more complete information, potentially uniquely identifying, about the individual. Without a clear understanding of what we mean by 'individual V, it seems impossible to specify appropriate distributions and, therefore, to effect our suggested analysis. In general, we do not even know how many individuals we are talking about.
In the sequel, we shall continue to assume that individuals in a are fully identifiable, so that, in particular, it is possible meaningfully to assign different prior probabilities n, to them, but we shall make no such assumption about unseen individuals.
5-2. Complete data
We first deal with the case in which the scene-of-crime evidence S yields a completely observed culprit characteristic, y c = x. We have the following general formulae, which make no explicit mention of individuals outside a:
where the 'match probability' l(x) is now denned by C*a).
It is implicit that the same unspecified constant of proportionality enters both (31) and (32). Formula (32) can be applied so long as we can specify the prior probability that the culprit is not among the measured individuals, and the conditional distribution of his profile given the data, assuming that he is not a measured individual.
Formulae (3) and (4) can be regarded as a way of calculating (32), by 'extending the conversation' to include the individual identifier i of C. However, in many contexts it may be more appropriate to extend the conversation to some other feature of C. Suppose that each individual i may be partially characterised, typically not uniquely, by a variable Y h a function of Xi-For example, Y might contain information on race, residence, etc. Note, however, that, since we are requiring Yj to be a function of Xt, such a formation typically requires a broad definition of the characteristic x, an d, with such a definition, the information about Xc obtainable from the crime sample will typically be incomplete, thus necessitating the extensions developed in § § 5-4 and 5-5 below.
We can expand l(x) as £^ = 3',Z. = £,C*a),
y where we have defined = Z,Cta).
Thus k = {k y } gives the probability distribution of the culprit's auxiliary variable, based on the evidence about identified individuals, assuming that the culprit is not one of these. In the common case that the suspect s is the only identified individual matching the scene-of-crime evidence, the posterior probability that he is guilty is thus 53. Evaluation of the match probability Distribution over Y. Assessment of the distribution k, given by (35), will typically be very context-dependent. In particular, when a incorporates a database, the criterion for inclusion of individuals in the database could very well depend on their values of Y: for example, the database could be stratified by race, with no attempt to represent the various races in their true proportions. Such a procedure violates the assumption we have so far made that the process determining a is uninformative about x-> a°d taking full coherent account of it could be extremely complex (Dawid & Mortera, 1996; Balding & Donnelly, 1996) . The associated 'correction factor' will, moreover, typically be extremely hard to specify clearly or convincingly, being very sensitive to plausible variations in the assumptions made. It will then often be reasonable to regard the data x x as uninformative about the distribution of Y c , and thus to take the distribution I for the culprit's auxiliary variable Y c as determined purely by the background evidence in the case.
Distribution conditional on Y. Now consider the term in (34) given by pr(Zc = *Hc = J',*« = &C#a).
So long as the selection criterion for inclusion of individuals into a depends only on the value of Y, no correction factor is needed conditional on Y, and we can evaluate (37) exactly as if the set a had been determined in advance. It will often be possible to define Y so as to satisfy this 'conditional uninformativeness' property, which we henceforth consider done.
Evaluation of the probability (37) is rendered more straightforward when the following assumption can be made. 
and we obtain
The term pr(x = x| Y= y, x a = £) in (39) depends only on the joint distribution of x«u{i}> where i is any individual not in a, and will generally be calculable using Assumption 1.
A special case of the above analysis is full exchangeability of the Xh Model E, with Y vacuous. Then we recover the formula (5).
5-4. Inaccurate evidence
We here extend the above alternative formulation to incorporate the framework of § 3, with the scene-of-crime evidence <S:Z = z again being related to the unobserved value x of Xc through the conditional probability/density g{z\x). Then in place of (31) and (32) we now obtain
x which we may again term the 'match probability' for this case. If Assumption 1, and thus (39), holds, we thus obtain /*(z) = £A y pr(Z = z|r=y,* a = a 
X denotes the common value, the same for all / £ a, of
Once again, pr(Z = z\ Y=y, % a = £) will be assessable from the observed data, using Assumption 1 and the known form of g(z \ x), whereas assessment of I may need to be based solely on external evidence. For an application of the above to DNA profile evidence, let Y denote racial group and Z the DNA profile. The database has complete information on ^ = (^, Z), but only Z is observed in the crime sample. Then Assumption 1 requires that, while the population as a whole need not be homogeneous with regard to racial make-up, if we restrict attention to individuals of a given race, the distribution of DNA profiles is homogeneous within that racial group. For analyses of DNA evidence with non-homogeneous populations see Balding & Nichols (1995) , Roeder et al. (1998 ), Foreman, Smith & Evett (1997 . We require pr(Z = z\ Y = y, x a = £), the probability that an individual has the observed profile, conditional on his racial group and the data on race and profile for the measured individuals.
DISCUSSION
Further extensions are possible. For instance, the measured traits on identified individuals could also be incomplete or error-prone.
Another variation arises in immigration cases, where claimed blood relationships are investigated. Here complex models analysing the full pedigree of the individual putting forth an immigration request need to be considered, and independence assumptions such as (2) possibly dropped, complicating the analysis. One way of approaching this type of problem could be to use graphical models (Spiegelhalter et al., 1993) to handle the dependence structure embodied in the pedigree.
Our conclusions are somewhat at odds with the recommendations of the National Research Council (1996) report. In particular, floating bins, if used, should be based on the crime measurement. Also, the suspect must be included in the database. Failure to do so will generally be unfair to the suspect.
